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The subject of this thesis is an attempt to identify the modern moral individual in G.W.F.
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. This topic will be brought out through a detailed analysis of
Hegel's reconstruction of Immanuel Kant's moral system and his “sublation” of it in the self of
“conscience.1” In demonstrating that Kant's moral system was grounded in the irreconcilable
conflict between morality and nature, Hegel set forth “conscience” as a concrete moral self—a
self that is the unity of actuality and pure knowledge. This reconstruction situates morality in the
individual self-relation and leads into the dialectic of tragic action. Put briefly, Hegel's
“conscience” is a transgressive structure of recognition established in a social context.
Throughout the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel's method of demonstrating action shows its
unforeseeable consequences since the action, with its motivation, and the deed, i.e. what has
been done, are not identical. In Hegel's dialectic the moral self develops out of Enlightenment's
critique of the existing social order, the Terror of the French Revolution, and a reconstruction of
Kantian morality into an ethical thought of the dialectic of evil and its forgiveness. The dialectic
unfolds as a division of “conscience” into a judging consciousness and an acting consciousness.
1

Hegel makes explicit the definition of his technical term ‘sublation’ in his Science of Logic. Sublation has a twofold meaning where “on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to
cease to be, to put an end to…Thus what is sublated is preserved…something is sublated only insofar as it has
entered into unity with its opposite.” G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, (Humanities International Press: New York,
1989), 107. Hegel’s sublation of the Kantian moral self-consciousness into the self of ‘conscience’ will demonstrate
its preservation insofar as the crucial role of moral authority will be sustained throughout the dialectic. At the
same time, the Kant’s moral system as such is surpassed in the actuality of conscience in an intersubjective
context.
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It is at this point of division that the modern moral individual appears most distinctly for Hegel.
Above all, it appears where the acting consciousness “confesses” to being particular, not
universal, and judging consciousness fails to respond in kind—in a delay between confession and
“forgiveness.” This is where I take the modern ethical individual to be situated by Hegel. The
questions that I wish to take up after articulating this dialectic in detail are as follows. What is
being revealed about the moral self in modernity? What implications does it have for the
possibility of a Hegelian ethics as distinct from Kantian morality?
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In my thesis Hegel regarded modernity as presenting tremendous difficulties for any idea
of the moral self. With the development and furthering of social orders developed out of limited
or failed systems of social cooperation of the past, any conception of the moral self must come
forth in the conditions of anonymity and alienation that affect the modern social context. Hegel's
analysis in the Phenomenology of Spirit of the unfolding of Geist (spirit) as a social being is
meant to demonstrate the possibility of a moral individual within the constructs of a developed
social order such as the modern liberal state (what he calls substance in the chapter on “spirit”).
Hegel was aware that after the Enlightenment’s critique of the existing social order and the
Terror of the French Revolution, the Kantian attempt to create a moral system from a purely
moral will also led to the felt loss in German Idealism of ethical life in having passed out of
tradition into an identification of the object of knowledge with pure duty. However, in Hegel's
reconstruction of Kant's moral system consciousness comes to realize that its capacity to know
both itself and its world will turn out to be based not solely on duty as its absolute essence but,
rather, on the communal process of tragic recognition. This is Hegel's “We that is I” and “I that
is We.” That is to say, the self can only become realizable to the self as both substance and
subject through the historical transformation of a subject coming to discover that it creates its
own history on the ground of actual duty-bound consciousness and in the form of “recognition
and indebtedness,” which is to say, in relation to others and a social world.2 In moving beyond

2

The Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit states that “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not
only as Substance, but equally as Subject.” (PS, 10) For our purposes, we can take this to mean that the subject will
identify itself as distinguishable from the world as well as capable of finding itself in it. Hegel writes: “this
Substance is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple, it is the
doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis

1

Kantian morality, the moral self becomes its own subject creating its own history, with the actual
self taking itself to be universal, not merely particular, and at the same time experiencing itself in
respect of an objective social world in and through its relation to others.
The section of the Phenomenology of Spirit titled “Spirit that is Certain of Itself:
Morality” is the essential component of my thesis since it is through Hegel's reconstruction of
Kantian morality that the moral subject comes to find itself in the world (and not as the moral
self in the transcendental subject). Further, Kant, who has brought the subject to a complete selfrelation, will become the ground for Hegel's ethics. However, to develop Hegel's ethical idea we
must enter into the dialectic of evil and its forgiveness as a theory of individual conviction and
tragic action.

[the immediate simplicity]” (ibid). Stern clarifies: “Hegel calls Spirit the subject that embodies this relation of
identity-in-difference to the world, by finding itself in its ‘other,’ so that while it is not cut off from the world
(radical dualism), it is not indistinguishable from it either (monism). Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of
Spirit, (Routledge: New York, 2002), 34

2

CHAPTER 2
HEGEL’S RECONSTRUCTION OF KANT’S MORAL SYSTEM

(1) The Moral Worldview

Hegel comes to Kant's conception of morality as a shape of spirit that develops out of
Enlightenment's critique of the existing social order (l'ancien régime) and the Terror of the
French Revolution. He stresses Kant's identification of the object of knowledge as pure duty. For
him, this is a crucial moment of spirit because Kant has brought the subject to an absolute selfrelation and this self-relation is the foundation of a moral view of the world. However, Hegel
also finds this self-relation to be incomplete and embedded in an irreconcilable conflict between
morality and nature. This section will show how Hegel reveals that conflict in a circle of
“postulates,” yet at the same time maintains the absolute self-relation of the moral self in his
sublimation of Kant's pure moral subject.
At the outset of the section on the “moral view of the world” in the chapter “Spirit that is
Certain of Itself: Morality,” Hegel notes that “self-consciousness knows duty to be the absolute
essence. It is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness, for which
duty cannot receive the form of something alien.”3 Here Hegel makes of Kant’s notion of
morality a form of spirit that takes the Kantian notion of duty to be the object of its knowledge.
His reconstruction of Kantian morality brings individuality and reflection to the forefront of what
he calls “the moral worldview” (die moralische Weltanschauung). In contrast to the Kantian
standpoint, the previous sections of the chapter titled “Spirit” were an analysis of responsibilities
and obligations imposed upon the self by external constraints, notably in the traditional laws of
3

G.W.F. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press: New York, 1977), 365.
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Greek ethical life. Now, however, the object of its philosophic inquiry is the subject’s own selfcertainty. For Hegel, this shape of spirit is rendered identical to the content of its self-knowledge.
By positing duty as its central conception, self-consciousness has made both the identity of
knowledge and the object of knowledge explicit for itself. The pure duty of Kantian morality is
taken as the expression of what spirit is and what it knows. Put succinctly, for the Kantian, acting
on the categorical imperative according to pure duty will involve acting “only in accordance with
that maxim (a rule that one gives governing one’s actions) through which you can at the same
time will that it become a universal law.”4
For Hegel, for the moral self-consciousness to know duty as its absolute essence is to
imply mediation. To be aware of mediation implies a relation to something other than
consciousness. The otherness that consciousness stands in relation to is its own nature, “whose
laws like its actions belong to itself as a being which is indifferent to moral self-consciousness,
just as the latter is indifferent to it.”5 Even though this moment of spirit knows duty to be its
absolute essence, it also knows that it has a nature which stands in an oppositional relationship to
moral self-consciousness. To put the matter simply, the moral view of the world that Hegel is
working through cannot stand on its own—it cannot merely be posited as a self-consciousness
that knows duty as its pure essence from the position of complete abstraction from actuality.
Rather, moral self-consciousness finds itself in a world—an actuality that stands completely
“without significance” for the content of consciousness. There is nothing about the reality of its
world that is taken to have bearing or influence as its reality on the inner content of duty-bound
self-consciousness. The Kantian moralist knows that what is essential to it in its content is its
own self-relation—both taking its orientation from its duty and the actualizing of its duty. Yet
4
5

Immanuel Kant Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Yale University Press: New York, 2002), 37
G.W.F. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press: New York, 1977), 365
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this duty has no relation to a nature that is posited as operating on its own law-like regularities,
and which in turn stands in a relationship of utter indifference to the essence of self-certain spirit.
As a result of this opposition, the Kantian moralist finds that nature may allow for its duties to be
fulfilled, or it may render this fulfillment impossible with equal indifference. Hegel will insist
that the relationship developed out of the moral view of the world consists in both “complete
indifference and independence of Nature towards moral purposes and activity,”6 and “the
consciousness of duty alone as the essential fact, and of Nature as completely devoid of
independence and essential being.”7
Hegel's critique of the moral world view will now consist of the development of
conflicting particular moments that present themselves in unfolding the relationship between
duty-bound self-consciousness and nature. Although nature is by necessity taken to be indifferent
to morality, it is nonetheless conceived in a manner in which it cannot actually be indifferent.8
Although moral self-consciousness will look for a way to unite what it has posited as separate,
each move made at reconciliation will merely displace the problem. In Hegel’s dialectic, which
treats moral self-consciousness as an experience, the inevitable and recurring displacements
eventually force themselves upon moral self-consciousness and lead it to move beyond the
rigidity of this moral worldview.
(2) The Postulates of the Unity of Morality and Nature
In order to bring out this crucial turning point for moral self-consciousness, Hegel
presents a reconstruction of Kantian morality as a set of “postulates.” These postulates are set
forth as though they were an experience of self-consciousness. In presenting Kant’s morality in
6

Ibid, 365
Ibid, 365-366
8
Terry Pinkard Hegel’s Phenomenology (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1994), 195
7
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this manner, Hegel is attempting to demonstrate that a transcendental self-relation cannot be a
moral standpoint. He begins with the first postulate, the harmony of morality and objective
nature, stating that “the harmony of morality and Nature—or, since Nature comes into account
only in so far as consciousness experiences its unity with it—the harmony of morality and
happiness, is thought of as something that necessarily is, i.e. it is postulated.”9 Moral selfconsciousness recognizes an incongruence between the moral order and the natural order.
However, moral self-consciousness also recognizes that it must be able to take duties as
something that can be accomplished in the world. Despite the distinction between nature and
morality that it must make in order to escape the non-moral regulations of nature, moral selfconsciousness sets forth the first postulate in an effort to show that there is a harmonious
relationship between the two as a demand of reason. Hence, the unification of nature with
morality is set forth by a specific consciousness and is concerned with seeing nature as
hospitable to the demands of duty-bound actions. Stern notes that at this point the moral
worldview “divorces morality from nature at one level, but tries to moralize it at another.”10 That
is to say, the moral worldview at first sees morality and nature as two conflicting and indifferent
absolutes, then reason demands the moralization of nature so as to accommodate actions
performed from duty. This demand of reason is set forth because moral self-consciousness must
be in a position to see its actions performed from pure duty as realizable in the world.
A similar incongruence is present in the second postulate proposed by the moral
worldview: the harmony of morality and the sensuous will. Moral self-consciousness knows duty
as its absolute essence. Yet it also knows that, as a natural being, it is linked to the world by
basic natural instincts and inclinations that influence its behavior. Moral self-consciousness now
9

G.W.F. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press: New York, 1977), 367
Robert Stern Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (Routledge Press: New York, 2002), 172
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finds itself in a struggle with the demands of its natural inclinations. On the one hand, it knows
that it operates from moral duty. On the other hand, as a natural being, it knows that the sensuous
demands of natural inclinations may not be in conformity with pure duty. Moral selfconsciousness thus aims at conforming the sensuous demands of its natural inclinations to
morality. However, our basic inclinations and instincts are not something we can merely set
aside. Since we cannot disregard our sense-nature, the unification of natural sensuous demands
with pure duty must be presented in the form of an endless progression. The moral worldview
therefore expresses a unity through infinite progress. Since the conformity of sensuous
inclinations to the moral will is only something that can be aimed at, a life that unfolds without
end must be postulated in order for a moral subject to make continual progress. Here, Hegel must
have in mind what Kant proposed in the Critique of Practical Reason where he wrote:
However, the perfect conformity of will to moral law is sainthood, a
perfection of which no rational being in the sensuous world is capable of
at any moment of his existence. Since, however, this perfection is
nonetheless demanded as being practically necessary, it can only occur in
a progression, leading to infinity, toward this perfect conformity.
Following the principle of pure practical reason, we have to admit such a
practical progression as the real object of our will.11

Since moral self-consciousness cannot merely set aside natural instincts and inclinations, this
postulate must appear as an endless progression towards the conformity of natural sensuousness
with morality. Sensuous nature in the moral life is made to conform to morality through an
endless progression whose aim must be projected into an “infinitely remote” future.
Lastly, Hegel presents the third postulate: the master and ruler of the world, for the
harmony of morality and happiness. The need for a divine legislator arises from a distinction that

11

Immanuel Kant The Critique of Pure Reason (Penguin Press: New York, 2008), 160
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Hegel sees in the form of conflicting duties. Moral self-consciousness may find that certain
circumstances require that the right course of action stems from specific duties (for example, the
obligation to provide for one’s family). However, moral self-consciousness experiences a
conflict between specific duties and pure duty. For example, although someone may operate
from the specific duty of providing for one’s family, one’s pure duty may be to provide for those
less fortunate. By providing for those less fortunate, the specific duties of providing for one’s
family are cast aside. However, it certainly ”feels” like the “right” thing to do would be to place
the importance of one’s family above the demands of the entirety of humanity’s less fortunate
population. The moral self-consciousness remains unable to resolve the conflict arising between
pure duty and specific duty. As Stern notes, moral self-consciousness “may feel that it is 'held
back' from doing what is its pure duty by the particularity of its situation, and it may therefore
question the validity of the specific duties which apply to it by virtue of being in that situation.”12
Moral self-consciousness will now feel as though it is not capable of operating from pure duty
alone. Hegel notes that when faced with multiple conflicting duties:
the moral self-consciousness in general heeds only the pure duty in them; the
many duties qua manifold are specific and therefore as such have nothing sacred
about them for the moral consciousness. At the same time, however, being
necessary, since the Notion of “doing” implies a complex actuality and therefore a
complex relation to it, these many duties must be regarded as possessing an
intrinsic being of their own.13

Although the moral self may feel a conflict between pure and specific duties, she will at least try
to do the right thing in hopes that God will see that she made an effort to do what is right. Thus,
the divine legislator of a God is posited so that any failure to observe pure duty will be seen as
not the fault of moral self-consciousness, since she has tried to do what is right given the
12
13

Robert Stern Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (Routledge Press: New York, 2002), 173
G.W.F. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press: New York, 1977), 369-370
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particular circumstances that she has found herself in. In the next section of the Phenomenology
of Spirit, titled “Dissemblance and Duplicity,” Hegel will demonstrate that the self-relation of the
subject of the moral worldview is both incomplete and embedded in an irreconcilable conflict
between morality and nature that is “dissembled” in its own standpoint.
(3) Dissemblance and Duplicity (Die Verstellung)
Hegel's analysis of the moral worldview involves a detailed critique of the three
postulates that he has Kant's moral system turn on. In summary, they are as follows:
1. The implicit harmony of morality and objective nature.
2. The conformity of the sensuous with morality.
3. There is a God that sanctifies moral law.
On Hegel's account, the postulates of the moral worldview will turn out to be “a whole
nest of thoughtless contradictions.”14 These contradictions take form in a series of
displacements—a shifting of the problem in respect of action—that will make explicit state of
hypocrisy in the moral worldview. In order to avoid hypocrisy, moral self-consciousness will
have to return to its position of absolute self-relation with the self-intuition denied it by Kantian
morality.15 However, before that position can be achieved, Hegel must have moral selfconsciousness go through the displacements embedded in the three postulates of the moral
worldview so that we can come to see its position as one of hypocrisy.

14

Ibid, 374
Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Northwest University
Press, 1974) 483-484
15

9

As regards the first postulate, the relationship between nature and moral selfconsciousness is “supposed to be an implicit harmony, not explicitly for actual consciousness,
not present; on the contrary, what is present is rather only the contradiction of the two.”16 The
first postulate asserts a harmony between moral self-consciousness and nature. The harmony is
implicit, which is to say that it is not actually present for actual consciousness. For Hegel, “the
actual moral consciousness, however, is one that acts; it is precisely therein that the actuality of
morality consists.”17 Before acting, moral self-consciousness postulates the harmony of morality
and nature as something that ”necessarily is.” However, if it were to act, it would actualize the
harmony. To perform an action in nature would then be to actualize this reconciliation. However,
this displaces the content of the postulate, which was asserted as something beyond the moral
self-consciousness. Put succinctly, the postulate and action are in contradiction with one another.
Since action is necessary to the concept of the moral self, the only way that moral selfconsciousness can maintain itself is through displacement. Hegel notes that “action therefore, in
fact directly fulfills what was asserted could not take place, what was supposed to be merely a
postulate, because the meaning of the action is really this, to make into a present reality what was
not supposed to exist in the present.”18 By presupposing that nature and morality are separate for
it, the Kantian moral consciousness fails to see that moral action is taken to be performable
within nature. However, to admit this would be to say that the harmony of morality and nature is
not a mere postulate of reason. As regards the separateness for moral consciousness of nature and
morality, the Kantian fails to be “in earnest about this, for in the deed the presence of this
harmony becomes explicit for it. But it is not in earnest even about the deed, since the deed is

16

G.W.F. Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford University Press: New York, 1977), 375
Ibid, 375
18
Ibid, 375
17
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something individual; for it has such a high purpose, the highest good.”19 The dissemblance that
Hegel means to reveal lies in this. First, moral self-consciousness postulates the unity of morality
and nature. As a postulate, it is implicit, not explicit. It is the final purpose of the world. For it as
a moral consciousness nature and morality “do not harmonize.”20 However, in the meaning of
action for moral self-consciousness, the unity must be actualized. The content of the first
postulate is hence displaced. In the concept of action, the harmony of nature and morality is
actual, i.e. for consciousness, rather than beyond moral self-consciousness.
The second postulate asserts the harmony of sense nature and moral self-consciousness.
The conformity of sensuous inclinations and instincts with moral self-conscious is a demand of
reason because moral self-consciousness “must be perfected in its own self.”21 However,
consciousness must continually make progress towards bringing about this conformity, since its
actualization would do away with moral consciousness. For Hegel, the conformity of natural
sensuous inclinations with pure duty must lie in an infinite beyond towards which the moral selfconsciousness must strive in order to be a moral self-consciousness. In situating the conformity
of the sensuous with morality in an infinite beyond, moral self-consciousness now “asserts that
its purpose is pure, is independent of inclinations and impulses, which implies that it has
eliminated sensuous purposes.”22 However, it now comes to discover that any attempt to bring its
purpose into the world would make sensuous inclination the mediating element or “middle term”
between pure duty and reality. Moral self-consciousness has maintained the elimination of its
sense-nature, but it now dissembles this. It finds that sense-nature is the very instrument by
which the moral self is realizable in the world. Hegel stresses that “moral self-consciousness is
19

Ibid, 377
Ibid 377
21
Ibid, 377
22
Ibid, 377
20
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not, therefore, in earnest with the elimination of inclinations and impulses, for it is just these that
are self-realizing self-consciousness. But also they ought not be suppressed, but only be in
conformity with Reason.”23 And since moral action is consciousness “realizing” itself, then
sensuous instincts do conform to reason. However, this actual conformity of sense-nature to
morality is now again displaced by the moral self-consciousness “in a nebulous remoteness
where nothing can be accurately distinguished or comprehended.”24 The second postulate
required an endless progression towards the conformity of sense-nature with morality, the
completion of which would be the attainment of moral perfection. Now, however, Hegel finds
the endless progression towards moral perfection a “dissemblance, a falsification of the situation,
since as a matter of fact it would be rather morality itself that was given up in its perfection,
because it is consciousness of absolute purpose as pure purpose, one therefore opposed to all
other purposes.”25 Since moral self-consciousness is not ‘in earnest’ with regards to the
perfection of morality, it displaces moral perfection into an infinite beyond. The idea of infinitely
progressing towards moral perfection is to speak of morality in terms of becoming achieved in
various degrees. However, moral self-consciousness took itself to be in essence pure duty, not an
incremental movement towards pure perfect duty. Again, Hegel finds the moral selfconsciousness to be in contradiction.
As regards the third postulate, if the moral worldview must postulate a God for the sake
of sanctifying specific duties, then the fundamental principle of Kantian moral autonomy is
called into question.26 The moral self-consciousness is only concerned with the one pure duty.

23

Ibid, 377
Ibid, 378
25
Ibid, 378
26
For Kant, autonomy is that property of the will “by which it is a law unto itself (independent of any property of
the objects of volition).” (G 4:440) Autonomy will involve the will’s capacity to render its own moral laws and also
motivates moral action for its own sake.
24
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The specific duties are deemed valueless according to the moral worldview. For Hegel, specific
duties can therefore “have their truth only in another being and are made sacred—which they are
not for the moral consciousness—by a holy lawgiver.”27 The holy lawgiver is introduced in order
to resolve what moral self-consciousness is incapable of resolving on its own. However, it is
difficult to understand how a divine moral legislator that stands beyond the relation of morality
to nature could be anything other than an unreal abstraction in which any concept of morality
would be done away with. Indeed, moral self-consciousness is put in the precarious position of
justifying how a holy lawgiver is not altogether beyond morality. As a pure, perfect being, the
Kantian God does not have a relationship to either nature or the moral self-consciousness. It
would be altogether “above the struggle of nature and sense.”28 Lacking a positive relation to
reality, this pure moral being is reduced to a dissemblance of facts. If pure morality is merely an
abstraction with no genuine relationship to reality, then it seems as though the moral actions
performed will have no moral meaning. Hyppolite reinforces this point by writing that “pure
duty must be beyond actual consciousness, beyond existence, but it must also be within
consciousness and, inasmuch as it is the beyond, it no longer means anything.”29 Hegel’s
emphasis on the postulates has therefore brought out the contradictions of the moral view of the
world, which in sum rest on the absolute opposition between nature and morality. In Hegel’s
dialectic moral self-consciousness renounces what it took to be true and returns to the absolute
self-relation.
Hegel's reconstruction of the Kantian moral worldview has stressed Kant's identification
of the object of knowledge as pure duty. This is a crucial moment in the development of spirit
27

Ibid, 380
Ibid, 381
29
Jean Hyppolite Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Northwestern University Press: New
York, 1974), 489
28
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because Kant has brought the subject to an absolute self-relation and this self-relation is the
foundation of a moral view of the world. However, as we have seen, Hegel also found this selfrelation to be incomplete and embedded in an irreconcilable conflict between morality and
nature. Although Hegel has revealed irreconcilable conflicts in the circle of Kantian “postulates,”
he will at the same time maintain the absolute self-relation of the moral self in his “sublation” of
Kant's pure moral self. This is why Kant is necessary to his thought of the modern moral self. To
Hegel, Kant’s transcendental turn brought the subject into an absolute self-relation. Hegel then
releases the moral subject from its invisible, transcendental position, yet maintains the
absoluteness of the self-relation in Kantian morality as a “moment” of his own ethical thought.
His movement beyond the transcendental perspective lies in his demonstration that Kant's moral
system is grounded in the irreconcilable conflict between morality and nature. Given that
demonstration, Hegel is now in a position to set forth the self of “conscience”: a self that is the
unity of actuality and pure knowledge. Hegel will now turn to the dialectical unfolding of
“conscience,” in the form of a dialectic of consciousness divided into the judging consciousness
and the acting consciousness.

14

CHAPTER 3
MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN HEGEL’S MORAL SELF

(1) Conscience

Hegel will now present a version of philosophical romanticism in an effort (a) to maintain
the self-determination achieved in the Kantian moral system, (b) to move beyond the difficulties
of realizing action that were inherent in the moral worldview, and (c) to draw out an objective
social world in which consciousness experiences itself, i.e. a conception of modernity.30 The first
half of the section titled “Conscience. The Beautiful Soul—Evil and its Forgiveness” articulates
the appearance of the attitude of conscience (Gewissen) in an effort to “complete” the Kantian
self-relation of the subject. This will be shown through a detailed analysis of conscience, the role
of language, and consciousness’s withdrawal into the 'beautiful soul.'
Kantian morality demonstrated two key features that play an essential role in the
formulation of Hegel's ethical process. Put baldly, the first is the notion of a fully autonomous
subject that appears in Kant’s purely moral will operating from the self-legislation that is
independent of external influence. The second is that the object of knowledge for consciousness
is pure duty. However, as was brought out in the dialectical unfolding of the moral worldview,
autonomy cannot be actual in Kant's moral system. The moral worldview, reduced to a 'nest of
thoughtless contradictions,' places the moral self in a position where moral action is rendered
impossible. Indeed, the necessity for the moral self to detach itself from all perspectives but its
own position of anonymity demonstrated the shortcomings of the moral worldview. That is to
say, in Hegel’s view the absolute self-relation of spirit is incomplete. In order to move beyond
30

Hegel’s attitude towards romanticism and its relationship to conscience is demonstrated in greater detail in both
Terry Pinkard’s Hegel’s Phenomenology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 208-213, and J.M.
Bernstein’s Confession and Forgiveness: Hegel’s Poetics of Action, 36
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this shortcoming, and yet still maintain the emphasis on self-determination, Hegel introduces the
self as the expression of conscience (Gewissen), a “spirit that is directly aware of itself as
absolute truth and being.”31 Conscience is the self-certain spirit, which immediately knows its
actual content as pure duty, whose form is conviction. Conscience further denotes the idea that
the self is the source of human experience. According to Hegel:
Moral self-consciousness having attained its truth, it therefore abandons, or rather
supersedes, the internal division which gave rise to the dissemblance, the division
between the in-itself and the self, between pure duty qua pure purpose, and reality
qua a Nature and sense opposed to pure purpose. It is, when thus returned into
itself, concrete moral Spirit which, in the consciousness of pure duty, does not
give itself an empty criterion to be used against actual consciousness; on the
contrary, pure duty, as also the Nature opposed to it, are superseded moments.
Spirit is, in an immediate unity, a self-actualizing being, and the action is
immediately something concretely moral.32
Conscience sees itself as a self-determining individual. It maintains awareness of a single
obligation: “must this action be performed, or not?” Conscience is acting consciousness
immediately aware of what is to be morally acted upon, as the content of his or her action
represents the doer’s own individuality. Conscience takes the form of a “simple self, which is
both a pure knowing and a knowledge of itself as this individual consciousness.”33 When
considered from the moment of action, conscience does away with the inconsistencies of the
moral worldview. Moral self-consciousness attempted to maintain separation between “pure duty
qua pure purpose, and reality qua a Nature and sense opposed to pure purpose.”34 This
distinction makes explicit what Hegel refers to as the division between the in-itself and the self.
Conscience does away with this distinction by taking reality to be something produced by
consciousness. That is to say, pure duty as pure knowing is the self of consciousness and the self
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of consciousness is actuality. Hence, acting moral self-consciousness, through action, overcomes
the paradoxes of Kantian morality. Conscience supersedes the paradoxes of the moral view of
the world (i.e. there is a moral consciousness, there is no moral consciousness, duty takes place
in consciousness, duty exists outside of consciousness, etc.) by recognizing that the differences
postulated by the moral worldview are not differences at all. Rather, these paradoxes were
brought out by the moral self-consciousness placing outside of itself in a transcendent Being
what it claimed as necessarily in-itself. Now however, conscience recognizes the intrinsic
sameness of what was taken as separate, i.e., pure duty and nature. Pure duty, since it is merely
an abstraction of thought, can only have its actuality made manifest in a reality of which
conscience is a part. Bernstein explains that “conscience claims immediate awareness and
certainty of its action as what it is universally and objectively obligated to do; subjective
conviction and objective duty coinciding.”35 Action is the immediate objective reality for
consciousness. The actualization of action takes shape as the pure form of the will, no longer
separating nature and pure duty, nor splitting up various duties. In moral self-consciousness we
saw that any divisions of duty resulted in the impossibility of moral action. However, conscience
sublates divisions of duty through simple action, renouncing the dissemblances of the moral
worldview.
Through moral action the distinctions made between duties are 'demolished.' That is to
say, since conscience is actualized through action, the sifting through various duties that could
not be acted upon no longer takes place. Rather, instead of parsing out a situation into various
potentially conflicting duties, conscience only considers whether or not an action is to be done.
Hegel notes that “action qua actualization is thus the pure form of the will—the simple
conversion of a reality that merely is into a reality that results from action, the conversion of the
35
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bare mode of objective knowing into one of knowing reality as something produced by
consciousness.”36 If we consider a case of moral action, we see that consciousness qua
conscience knows this particular case immediately. Further, it knows that this case only exists
insofar as conscience exists. The situation that the adopted attitude of conscience finds itself
immersed in is purely subjective. With Hyppolite, “This concrete situation is not objective, in the
sense of being determined by some impersonal consciousness which could so to speak hover
over the situation.”37 Rather, awareness of a particular situation is the same as the situation itself.
Reality is willed by consciousness by way of the adopted attitude of conscience.
Clearly Hegel is making a shift from the transcendental idealist view of the subject
represented by the moral worldview to self as he or she actually appears in a world. For Hegel,
conscience is the attitude of simple action that “knows and does what is concretely right.”38 It
knows what is right because conscience is inwardly certain of the rightness of its moral
convictions. This conviction is the very essence of conscience and represents a conception of
morality that seems to verge on the absurd.39 This simple self takes the apparent grounding of
morality to stem from conviction. The self knows that an action is right because it is convinced
that it is right. Further, what makes it right for the self is the conviction that it is right. A moral
theorist could easily hear in this position the claim, “You want to know why it is right? Because
of my conviction that it is!” Hegel maintains emphasis on conviction so as to demonstrate the
essentiality of self-legislation for conscience. The content of the moral action takes the form of
“the doer's own immediate individuality; and the form of the content is just this self as a pure
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movement, viz. as [the individual's] knowing or his own conviction.”40 That is, by acting in
accordance with my own moral convictions, I am free to determine for myself what counts and
what should be acted upon. True freedom consists in acting from this deeply personal point of
view. Conscience thus acts according to its inner convictions, concretely making manifest its
content in an empirical reality through the performance of action.
In Hegel’s Phenomenology, Terry Pinkard suggests an objection that may be raised at this
point that is worth exploring. What if there are two consciences expressing conflicting demands
of inner conviction?41 When moral conviction is actualized in a concrete empirical reality,
conscience becomes aware of an 'other.' Hegel maintains that this other is in fact the reality that
makes moral action realizable. Moral action can only be actualized in a specific reality, not in the
empty abstraction of thought. This is why Hegel expresses the idea that moral laws exist for the
sake of the self, not vice versa.42 Hegel claims that this reality is “the reality of consciousness
itself, and consciousness not as a mere 'thought-thing' but as an individual.”43 Actions performed
in reality take the form of the doer's individuality, based solely upon the inner convictions by
which they appear in reality.
The next step vital to Hegel’s argument is his acknowledgment that actions performed
from one's convictions possess an enduring reality through the moment of recognition and
acknowledgement by other members of a community. Hegel specifies that “the deed is
recognized and thereby made real because the existent reality is directly linked with conviction
or knowledge; or, in other words, knowing one's purpose is directly the element of existence, is
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universal recognition.”44 Furthermore, reality is not a desolate island on which conscience finds
itself existing in a solitary manner. Rather, conscience exists within the social context of other
consciences where each member of the community acts from his or her own convictions. The
inner convictions of conscience that are brought to the forefront of attention represent the
common element between various members of a social community comprised of other
consciences. As Pinkard stresses, in the romantic ideal of a truly free community of selves, all
individuals would “freely recognize the right of conscience of others, and, since each would be
genuinely free, each would be acting in concert with the others.”45 Thus, conscience sees no
problem with the objection raised earlier by Pinkard, i.e., that the conviction that two
consiousnesses might conflict, since each member of the community is free to act from their own
conscience. What is considered as 'right' in the community is the notion that members are acting
from the purity of their convictions, rather than the “duty” itself in the sense of the content that
the action realizes. Each individual recognizes and acknowledges the existence and freedom of
others, rather than committing members of a community to places in particular social orders.
In Hegel's critique of Greek ethical life, presented earlier in the Phenomenology of Spirit,
the various members of the social structure are forced into a fixed order relative to their gender.
In contrast, in the dialectic of “conscience,” members of a society are free to act on their own
convictions. These actions receive affirmation from the other members of the community. It is
the community that acknowledges the appropriateness of actions, and the appropriateness of an
action is demonstrated through being performed solely from the convictions of the individual.
Hegel stresses that that “the doer, then, knows what he does to be a duty, and since he knows
this, and the conviction of duty is the very essence of moral obligation, he is thus recognized and
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acknowledged by others. The action is thereby validated and has actual existence.”46 The validity
and actuality of the action is demanded by individual conscience from a community that is
nothing more than the recognition of conviction.
The key to understanding Hegel's conception of conviction, then, lies in what he means
by recognition. For Hegel, one's deepest conviction implies a relation to other consciousnesses.
Conscience is the common relational element between groups of self-consciousnesses. This
element is “the substance in which the deed has an enduring reality, the form of being
recognized and acknowledged by others.”47 This leads Hyppolite to claim that “when I am
convinced, I presuppose that my conviction is as valid for others as for myself; I seek or demand
recognition for my conviction.”48 Conscience requires others to whom to declare his or her
convictions. In turn, others are necessary for the acknowledgement of these convictions. Actions
have moral meaning only insofar as they are expressed within this social setting. The moment
that an action has been performed, it must be acknowledged as done from conviction. In so
doing, “the deed is recognized and thereby made real because the existent reality is directly
linked with conviction or knowledge; or, in other words, knowing one's purpose is directly the
element of existence, is universal recognition.”49 The action performed by conscience is the
simple expression of the form of its content. Hegel states that “the essence of action, duty,
consists in conscience's conviction about it; it is just this conviction that is the in-itself; it is the
implicitly universal self-consciousness, or the state of being recognized, and hence a reality...but
taken separate and alone without the content of self, duty is a being-for-another, something
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transparent which has merely the significance of an essentiality in general, lacking all content.”50
In sum, conscience in Hegel articulates a self-determining conscientious self, a self
capable of determining for itself what is morally required of it. However, Hegel will implement
the same criticism of displacing and dissembling that he used in relation to the moral worldview
in order to demonstrate conscience's shortcomings. Conscience will soon find itself falling victim
to the indeterminateness of its convictions, as well as the arbitrariness of the actions it performs.
The following section of this chapter will demonstrate how conscience develops into two ways
of being the moral self—acting conscience and the beautiful soul—in an effort to overcome the
criticism of displacement and dissemblance.
(2) Fallibalism and Interpretive Pluralism51

When conscience acts, it is aware that it is acting in a context and cannot possibly render
all of the particularities of circumstance knowable. Reality for conscience is a “plurality of
circumstances which breaks up and spreads out endlessly in all directions, backwards into their
conditions, sideways into their connections, forwards in their consequences.”52 Knowledge is
faced with incomplete knowledge, or 'non-knowledge.' That is to say, the circumstances of any
particular situation extend beyond the limits of human comprehension. In order to have
knowledge of what is the absolute 'right' course of action, conscience would have to be in
possession of all the present conditions of a situation and all possible foreseeable consequences.
However, this is an untenable position for conscience, since past circumstances, present
particularities, and future repercussions are shrouded in uncertainty. Hence as Bernstein
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proposes, conscience is in a position of moral fallibility. It could only be objectively certain of its
duty if it was in possession of complete knowledge. Hegel stresses this position by stating that,
when conscience acts, it is not acting with “full acquaintance of all the attendant circumstances
which are required, and that its pretense of conscientiously weighing all the circumstances is
vain”53 However, conscience acknowledges that its knowledge is, although incomplete,
sufficient in virtue of it being its own knowledge.
Similarly, when conscience acts, it “enters into relation with the many aspects of the
case.”54 The case is perceived by conscience to have multiple components through which the
case becomes a 'multiplicity of duties.’ These multiple components signify the various possible
duties that conscience may act on. Although conscience no longer experiences a conflict between
multiple duties, Hegel notes that “conscience knows that it has to choose between them, and to
make a decision; for none of them, in its specific character or in its content is absolute; only pure
duty is that.”55 However, since pure duty itself is merely an empty formality, conscience limits
itself to the pure conviction of a duty. As such, actions performed by conscience may be
construed by others to have disastrous consequences. Bernstein stresses that, “No choice nor the
action that it engenders can be beyond deliberative reproach even, and especially from those
most affected by it.”56 Unforeseeable consequences are, for Hegel, a necessary component of the
complexities of a community inhabited by self-determining selves.
Nonetheless, conscience must act because of its own self-conception according to Hegel.
The actions performed by conscience shape its individuality in the sense that in performing the
action, conscience determines on its own which convictions are to be acted upon. For Hegel,
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“action is called for, something must be determined by the individual, and the self-certain spirit
in which the in-itself has attained the significance of the self-conscious 'I,' knows that it has this
determination and content in the immediate certainty of itself.”57 The conviction that actions
stem from is a pure knowing by which all acts attain permissibility, provided their inception
stems from the individuality of a conscience.
However, this introduces an arbitrariness into the actions of acting consciousness.
Conscience knows that actions are necessary. With arbitrariness entering in at this point of the
discussion, we have to recognize that acts are done through the determinations of 'natural
consciousness' via its “impulses and inclinations.”58 Hyppolite explains that “we can justify
anything provided we are able to convince ourselves of the conformity of our action with duty by
firmly holding onto the way in which the action can be considered as duty.”59 Once an action has
been performed, although it remains the action of conscience, others may not necessarily
acknowledge it. As Hegel specifies, the duty which conscience fulfills “is a specific content.”
it is true that this content is the self of consciousness, and so consciousness's
knowledge of itself, its identity with itself. But once fulfilled, set in the medium
of being, this identity is no longer knowing, no longer this process of
differentiation in which its differences are at the same time immediately
superseded; on the contrary, in being, the difference is established as an enduring
difference, and the action is a specific action, not identical with the element of
everyone's self-consciousness, and therefore not necessarily acknowledged.60
The conscience that acts and the community that recognizes and acknowledges are free
of the actual content of the action. Freed from the specificity of any particular duty that may be
performed, there is no way to affirm its moral value. Moreover, since a self of conscience is not
in a position to control the 'meaning' of its action as others interpret it, the meaning of an action
57
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is open to multiple interpretations. This is what Bernstein refers to as “interpretive pluralism.”61
It is the way in which what Hegel calls dissemblance reappears in the dialectic of conscience. In
addition, what conscience places before the community, the community in turn displaces or
dissembles as it is “something expressing only the self of another, not their own self.”62
At this point in the discussion, there is no way to attach a moral signification to the deed.
Hegel has, I believe, set forth the idea that conscience is not at this point responsible for the
unintended repercussions of its actions, since it is not yet bound to the content of its actions. The
problem of “being bound” will require a more complex dialectic of recognition than what the
shape of consciousness is presenting at this point. It can only be demonstrated when the dialectic
of recognition encompasses actions and responses of others. At our current juncture Hegel shows
that since conscience is freed from the specifics of the actualization of its duty in actions, others
cannot know if its intentions are good or evil. An action may be seen differently relative to the
social situation in which it was committed. For example, I increase the amount of property that I
own in an effort to better maintain and provide for my family, which I maintain as my duty.
Others however, believe that my actions are pure humbug, insisting that my duty rests in a
different facet of this particular 'case.' In effect, others do not value my actions in the same way
that I do.
What conscience is lacking is a way of interpreting the value of an action. For Hegel,
“what is acknowledged is not the determinate aspect of the action, not the intrinsic being, but
solely the self-knowing self as such. The element of lasting being is the universal selfconsciousness; what enters into this element cannot be the effect of the action.”63 Conscience
now seeks a way to interpret action. What subsists as the true mode of conscience’s self61
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expression is what conscience verbally articulates. So Hegel now brings language to the forefront
as the shape of the “existence of Spirit.”64

(3) Language and the Beautiful Soul
Hegel places a tremendous importance on the role of language throughout the
Phenomenology of Spirit. Indeed, it is language that initiates the very first movement of sensecertainty, where it attempts to affirm knowledge of the immediate, what simply is, through the
assertions “This!” “Here!” “Now!” But language says the universal not the immediate. As
Hyppolite says, language has accompanied “every important moment of the life of spirit, it
incarnates the originality of every moment.”65 It has taken on various roles throughout the
Phenomenology of Spirit. For example, in Greek ethical life, language expresses the laws by
which individuals are commanded. Yet at the moment of Greek ethical life, language exists for
the sake of directing the conduct of the members of a community.66 That is, it does not yet exist
for the self. Now, however, language serves to alter the appearance on the scene of conscience.
Through language, convictions are verbally articulated by a specific individual consciousness,
thus giving meaning to the act for others. Hegel stresses this point by writing that “we see
language as the existence of spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing for others, selfconsciousness which as such is immediately present, and as this self-consciousness is
universal.”67 The language of conviction gives rise to an objectivity of the self, serving as the
common medium by which conscience preserves its actuality and is concretely recognized by
others. The language of conscience will make manifest self-consciousness’s ability to assert its
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inner certainty as a universal truth for others to recognize as universal. It is what Hegel refers to
as the emergence of the 'middle term,' a mediation between the individuality of conscience and
the plurality of other self-consciousnesses whose recognition is intrinsic to the meaning of
conviction. He elaborates as follows:
The content of the language of conscience is the self that knows itself as essential
being. This alone is what it declares, and this declaration is the true actuality of
the act, and the validating of the action. Consciousness declares its conviction; it
is in this conviction alone that the action is a duty; also it is valid as duty solely
through the conviction of being declared. For universal self-consciousness is free
from the specific action that merely is; what is valid for that self-consciousness is
not the action as an existence, but the conviction that is a duty; and this is made
actual in language.68
At this point in the dialectic, self-consciousness believes that its actions are valid through
the public declaration of its internal conviction. Conscience openly asserts that its actions are
based upon its innermost duty. In so doing, conscience translates its content into the form of
'immediate self-certainty.' That is, through verbal affirmation, conscience affirms the conviction
that its duty stems from and that it knows what its duty is. Bernstein notes that “it is only through
language, through the performative declaration of conviction, that the expressive dimension of
action achieves actuality, and so a being there for others.”69 The innermost conviction of
conscience becomes determinate for the self and others, together, when articulated through
language. Conscience takes language to be the only adequate form of expression of its action.
This is a crucial point for conscience for it is, in effect, publicly declaring that it acts on
and from its own conscience through pure self-determination in a way that is clearly
recognizable for other members of a community. Individuality is being made manifest through
the self's ability to determine on its own what is right for it to act upon. Conscience states that
“its knowing and willing are right. The declaration of this assurance in itself rids the form of its
68
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particularity. It thereby acknowledges the necessary universality of the self...but it is essential
that he should say so, for this self must be at the same time this universal self.”70
Elevated above specific law and the content of duty, conscience now sees that it is free to
assert what is its own 'knowing and willing.' Hegel explains that “the self's immediate knowing
that is certain of itself is law and duty. Its intention, through being its own intention, is what is
right; all that is required is that it should know this, and should state its conviction that its
knowing and willing are right.”71 What is taken to have value is not the action performed but
rather the means by which it is made actual in the world. This gives rise to what Hegel refers to
as the 'moral genius.' The moral genius knows “the inner voice of what it immediately knows to
be a divine voice; and since, in knowing this, it has an equally immediate knowledge of
existence, it is the divine creative power which in its Notion possesses the spontaneity of life.
Equally it is its own divine worship, for its action is the contemplation of its own divinity.”72 For
the moral genius, what counts is the active internal consideration of its 'divine force.' Hegel
explains that “this solitary divine worship is at the same time essentially the divine worship of a
community, and the pure inner knowing and perceiving of itself advances to the moment of
consciousness. The contemplation of itself is its objective existence and its objective element is
the declaration of its knowing and willing as something universal.”73 What Hegel means by this
is the certainty of conscience that has an actual existence as community. This is a crucial
moment in the text, taking us up to the beautiful soul. Hegel stresses that “the actuality and
lasting existence of what it [conscience] does is universal self. On account of this utterance in
which the self is expressed and acknowledged as essential being, the validity of the act is
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acknowledged by others.”

74

The moral genius verbally declares its knowing and willing as

something that is universal. Through its declaration, “the self acquires moral validity and the act
becomes an effective deed...on account of this utterance in which the self is expressed and
acknowledged as essential being, the validity of the act is acknowledged by others.”75 What
supports this “moral validity” is the certainty of conscience that it is the immediate unity of self
and absolute Being.
It would appear, then, that with the moral genius we have left behind the difficulty of
others acknowledging the purity of her knowing, for this knowledge is religion as the
community. Hegel explains that “the spirit and substance of their association are thus the mutual
assurance of their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over this mutual purity, and
the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cherishing and fostering,
such an excellent state of affairs.”76 Although this is a form of self-consciousness and spirit, it is
one in which self-consciousness has, in effect, withdrawn from externality into its 'innermost
being.' Hyppolite stresses that what the self discovers within itself is a divine voice, “its
enjoyment of itself is at the same time its enjoyment of the divine within it.”77 In order for us to
grasp that this divine voice has an objective existence, the moral genius must be understood as a
participant in a community of moral geniuses in which each member publicly asserts and all
recognize the divinity of the self. This community is like a kingdom of heaven on earth in which
the divinity of the individual has the form of objective universality because that divinity is “for”
the community: the meaning of self-consciousness. The moral genius's claim that its knowledge
of itself is divine self-knowledge “is religion, which as knowledge that has a perceived or outer
74
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existence is the utterance of the community concerning its own spirit.”78
For Hegel, although the utterance of the moral genius is an act and although the
individual is immediately a community, the moral genius is in dread of action and of an
existence. The withdrawal into itself is the inability to endure its very existence. The moral
genius now appears as what Hegel calls the 'beautiful soul.' It has taken a turn towards an
extreme in which the certainty of its self will collapse in its untruth. Hegel writes that “selfconsciousness has withdrawn into its innermost being, for which all externality as such has
vanished—withdrawn into the contemplation of the 'I'='I', in which this 'I' is the whole of
essentiality and existence.”79 In abstracting itself from the realm of the external, the beautiful
soul has eliminated action from its essentiality. Yet, action was what initiated the attitude of
conscience and what was taken as its essential content. As Hyppolite explains, the arrival of the
beautiful soul has led self-consciousness to sink “into the void of its subjectivity and [it]
becomes incapable of any positive action because it refuses to alienate itself, to give determinate
and external content to the concept.”80 It sees that the only way to maintain its absolute purity is
to abstract itself from externality, so that any action it performs would taint the preservation of
the purity the beautiful soul so deeply cherishes. The beautiful soul “lives in dread of
besmirching the splendor of its inner being by action and an existence; and, in order to preserve
the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world, and persists in its self-willed
impotence to renounce its self which is reduced to the extreme of ultimate abstraction.”81
Without any content, the beautiful soul cannot but waste away in the emptiness of its lost soul.
Both the beautiful soul and acting conscience that we began with designate incomplete
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moments of the self of conscience that necessitate reconciliation between the two. The beautiful
soul hoped to maintain the universality of its divinity through abstraction and withdrawal into
itself. However, this has effectively extinguished the possibility of action, thus rendering the self
into a “shapeless vapor that dissolves into thin air”82 In contrast, conscience took itself to be pure
self-determination made manifest through its conviction. However, acting conscience came to
grief on the finitude of its knowledge in respect of action and on interpretive pluralism. To
resolve the matter, Hegel will delve deeper into the problem of human action by way of acting
and judgment. He writes in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit that:

Beauty hates the understanding for asking of her what it cannot do. But the life of
spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by
devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its
truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as
something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of
something that it is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, turn away
and pass onto something else; on the contrary, spirit is this power only by looking
the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the
magical power that converts it into being.83
The fallibalism that rendered action problematic and the extinguishing of the self through pure
contemplation demonstrates the need for the moral self to restate itself. This process will be
taken up in the third chapter through a reexamination of conscience considered as action and
judgment parsed out into the relation between two individual self-consiousnesses. Hegel’s notion
of conscience will 'tarry' with the communal process of tragic recognition, presented in the
dialectic of evil and its forgiveness, as I will show in the following chapter of my thesis.
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CHAPTER 4
THE DIALECTIC OF EVIL AND FORGIVENESS

The aim of this chapter is to explain the unfolding of Hegel’s dialectic of evil and its forgiveness
located in the final subsection of the chapter entitled “Morality.” Hegel’s goal is to demonstrate a
dialectical standpoint whereby an ethical spirit is made actual through the relationship, conflict, and
movement between two forms of consciousness—a self-determined acting spirit and a spirit of judgment.
The distinction between these two forms of consciousness arises from Hegel’s consideration of
conscience from the standpoint of action. Reconciliation between these two standpoints, and hence the
establishment of an ‘objectively existent Spirit,’ will be demonstrated through acting consciousness’s
confession of its one-sidedness to judging consciousness and judging consciousness’s failure to respond
in kind to this confession. The repulsion of the confession establishes judging consciousness as the ‘hard
heart’ and determines the necessity of a ‘throwing away’ of oneself in order for spirit to attain self-certain
unity. The delay that occurs between the act of confession and the act of forgiveness followed by the
breaking of the hard heart is the crucial moment for understanding Hegel’s ethical idea, since it ushers
forth the actualization of individuality through the tragedy of human history for the modern moral self.
Furthermore, it is at this particular moment in the dialectic where the transformation of the self discovers
that it is creating its own history in relation to others in a social world. In order to establish this worldly,
historical spirit, I will provide a careful analysis of (a) the relationship between acting consciousness and
judging consciousness, (b) the confession of evil, and (c) the breaking of the hard heart.

32

(1) Acting Consciousness and Judging Consciousness

After the 'internal collapse' of the beautiful soul, Hegel insists that “the evaporated life has,
however, still to be taken in the other meaning of the actuality of conscience, and in the manifestation of
its movement: conscience has to be considered as acting.”84 In taking up this ‘other meaning’ of the
actuality of conscience, Hegel intends to make clear the process that conscience enters into when it acts.
Hegel presents three important features of conscience as acting consciousness. First, conscience still takes
itself to be morally authoritative.85 This carryover from Hegel’s sustained critique of Kant’s moral theory
suggests that Kant still remains very much in the background of the ethical idea that Hegel is attempting
to establish. Hyppolite reinforces this point by stating that “acting spirit determines itself by itself, but at
the same time demands that its own truth be recognized as absolute truth.”86 Second, conscience knows
that it is distinct from other individuals. Hegel stresses that conscience knows that “qua this particular
self, [it is] distinct from other selves... each consciousness is just as much simply reflected out of its
universality into itself.”87 I take Hegel to be formally indicating the necessity of a community for ethical
action to take place in. In this community each individual consciousness maintains certainty of its
distinction from other members of the community, and yet also has a reflective continuity with the
community. Third, Hegel insists that conscience must be engaged in the world, since he aims to show that
it is only through active participation in a social world that consciousness can express its inner
determination. However, the implications of active participation in a world suggest that, once again, the
purpose of acting conscience’s actions for itself may not coincide with what it is for others, i.e. the deed
and how it is perceived by others will develop into an antithetical position that cannot be maintained.
Hegel returns to language in order to begin the development of the antithesis between the purpose
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of the action for-itself and what it is for others. When acting conscience speaks of the conscientiousness
of its actions, “it may well be aware of its pure self, but in the purpose of its action, a purpose with an
actual content, it is aware of itself as this particular individual, and is conscious of the antithesis between
what it is for itself and what it is for others, of the antithesis of universality or duty and its reflection out
of universality into itself.”88 From the very moment when it acts, individual conscience knowingly enters
into this antithesis. The action of conscience will immediately lead to a disparity between the purpose in a
particular individual’s action and its interpretation by others. It would appear that we have merely
reproduced the previous oppositional moments of the text with an all-too-familiar conflict in which
another attitude of the moral or ethical self cannot be maintained. However, Hyppolite clarifies this issue
by explaining that “the opposition has taken a concrete form; more exactly, it is two figures of
consciousness that are presented to us, each containing the two moments—the universal and the
specific—but with different values.”89 Further, the starting point of analysis for both selves is the
commonality of self-certainty of duty.
The manner in which this antithesis will play itself out can be parsed out as follows. When
conscience acts, it is expressing its morally authoritative inner being. It places “itself, its ends, and the
ends of others, against an inert universality that claims to be devoid of all individuality (because [it takes
itself as] a perfected expression of it [its inner being]).”90 However, this demonstrates an inevitable
conflict between acting consciousness and what Hegel refers to as ‘universal consciousness.’ Universal
consciousness should be interpreted as the expression of consciousness for which takes its essential being
to be a universal duty. It is a form of consciousness that views duty as ‘universally acknowledged’
principles standing over and above the individual. According to Bernstein, acting consciousness appears
to universal consciousness “as only a self, an individual posing its individual claims in opposition to those
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of the community at large.”91 From the perspective of universal consciousness, acting conscience is
viewed as evil, since it affirms its inner determination over and above the universal duty that constitutes
the essential being of universal consciousness.92 This is taken by universal consciousness as a denial of
what acting consciousness claimed made it conscientious. However, acting consciousness must affirm this
claim, since this affirmation represents the very manifestation of its individuality.
Further, acting consciousness is held by universal consciousness to be hypocritical since it “it
declares its actions to be in conformity with itself, to be duty and conscientiousness.”93 Although acting
consciousness claims to be conscientious, its actions do not coincide with what is duty for universal
consciousnesses because the individual act will be in opposition to the claims of the community. Stern
introduces universal consciousness as “individuals…who abide by the established moral order.” This
interpretation is, I believe, effective in articulating Hegel’s general argument. Consequently, if we
navigate our way through this section of the text under the parameters that Stern has introduced, then the
argument looks something like this: acting consciousness seeks partnership with other members of a
community on its own terms. Accordingly, at the moment when acting conscience “declares its actions to
be in conformity with itself, to be duty and conscientiousness,”94 acting conscience believes that it has the
sufficient conditions under which its ethical content can be established. On the other hand, universal
consciousness takes acting conscience to be masking its hypocrisy by making a ‘show’ of its respect for
duty. Rather than pat the acting consciousness on the back and sing high praises for demonstrating that its
actions are in conformity to his inner being, universal consciousness perceives acting consciousness in
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the worst possible manner. Hegel appears to regard the manifestation of this will, as evil, to be necessary.
He stresses that “the movement of this antithesis is in the first instance the formal production of an
identity of what the evil consciousness is in its own self and what it declares itself to be; it must be made
apparent that it is evil, and thus its existence made to correspond to its essence; the hypocrisy must be
unmasked.”95 Universal consciousness will judge acting consciousness in order to unmask its evil and
hypocritical position.

(2) The Confession of Evil

The developments of the previous section announced two forms of consciousness at work in this
section of the Phenomenology. In taking itself to be morally authoritative, acting consciousness is one
side of what leads to an inevitable conflict between itself and a universal consciousness that knows its
essential being to be universal duty. Consequently, universal consciousness holds acting consciousness to
be both evil and hypocritical. The goal of this section is to unpack the complexities of evil in this crucial
stage of the dialectic.
Acting conscience must be made aware that its attitude is both evil and hypocritical. The process
unfolds as follows: Acting consciousness expresses its inner being by publicly declaring the
conscientiousness of its actions to others. It demands that others recognize its moral authority, since its
‘essential being’ (that which makes conscience what it is) is its moral autonomy. In the moment of action,
the moment when the self determines itself, it also demands that its inner convictions are acknowledged
in order for the action to have moral relevance in an intersubjective environment. This is the true moment
of opposition whereby the universality of the articulated statement and the particularity of the purpose,
which appears in the deed’s content, finally appears to consciousness.
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At the moment when acting consciousness acts, universal consciousness views it as evil, since the
‘universal’ element of acting conscience is not the same ‘universal’ duty-bound element of universal
consciousness. It judges acting consciousness to be affirming the individuality of its purpose over and
above the duty that universal consciousness takes as the essential certainty of its being, since the latter
looks at every action “from the point of view of conformity to duty rather than from the point of view of
the doer.”96
From the moment when acting consciousness publicly asserts that its action is a duty, universal
consciousness is in a position of judgment. Universal consciousness, henceforth judging consciousness,
“looks at what the action is in itself, and explains it as resulting from an intention different from the action
itself, and from selfish motives.”97 Through the process of judgment, judging consciousness anticipates
that acting consciousness will admit both (a) that its action is particular, not universal, and subsequently
(b) that its action is in accordance to its own inner law, and hence in opposition to the acknowledged
universal. However, there is more to the claim of judgment than what is immediately apparent to judging
consciousness. When acting consciousness is denounced as hypocritical, judging consciousness is
“appealing in such judgment to its own law, just as evil consciousness appeals to its law. For the former
comes forward in opposition to the latter and thereby as a particular law. It has no superiority over the
other law, rather it legitimizes it.”98 Although this is not apparent to judging consciousness, the complex
interplay between universal law and particular manifestations of holding universal law demonstrates that
the gulf between these two attitudes of consciousness may not be as clear as initially constructed.
The problem of judgment is further complicated when judging consciousness is considered from
the standpoint of action. Put succinctly, universal consciousness is unwilling to act. Instead, it remains
content in its realm of universal thought. Parallels to the ‘beautiful soul’ of the previous chapter are
obvious. Judging consciousness maintains itself in thought—its judgment is one of passivity vis-à-vis
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action. It does not enter into the same position of entanglement that acting consciousness entered into
when it acts, i.e., from the antithesis of universality and individuality. Rather, “it does well to preserve
itself in its purity, for it does not act; it is the hypocrisy which wants its judging to be taken for an actual
deed, and instead of proving its rectitude by actions, does so by uttering fine sentiments.”99 Nonetheless,
Hegel insists that its nature is the same as the acting consciousness that it reproaches. That is, he has
attempted to establish a complimentary relationship between (a) the attitude of a consciousness that
maintains the ‘selfish purpose’ of its actions, and (b) an attitude of consciousness that has effectively
reduced duty to the realm of utterances through its failure to act at all. For Hegel, “the consciousness that
judges in this way is itself base, because it divides up the action, producing and holding fast to the
disparity of the action with itself.”100 Further, judging consciousness has itself adopted a hypocritical
position, since it still takes its judgment to be a form of action. However, judging consciousness has
effectively rendered its position to one of unreality and conceit. Neither consciousness can therefore claim
the identity of universal duty and their action.
Acting consciousness takes judging consciousness to be “according to its own nature and
disposition, identical with himself [i.e., acting consciousness].”101 Acting consciousness seeks to establish
this through a confession of commonality. The language of conviction now takes the form of the language
of confession as an expression of the identical dispositions between the two forms of consciousness.

Perceiving this identity and giving utterance to it, he confesses this to the other, and
equally expects that the other, having in fact put himself on the same level, will also
respond in words in which he will give utterance to this identity with him, and expects
that this mutual recognition will now exist in fact.102
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The key point at this moment in the dialectic is that this is not an abasement, humiliation, or a throwingaway of oneself. Acting consciousness is not declaring that its position is evil and hypocritical. Rather,
acting consciousness is merely stating that it recognizes its judge to be the same as itself, i.e. particular,
rather than a universal consciousness. The ramifications of this moment in the dialectic are significant. In
recognizing what is common between the judge and itself, the other’s standpoint appears as particular too.
Further, it appears that Hegel is demonstrating that the certainty that acting consciousness operates from
does not warrant entitlement to claims of universal authority. Rather, it is through confession that acting
consciousness attempts to establish the shared, common condition of the community. It is the hope that
you, the other, can find yourself in my words that is motivating acting consciousness in the confession.
The aim is to make concrete what Hegel has sought to establish throughout the entirety of the
Phenomenology of Spirit, namely, the “pure self-recognition in absolute otherness”103 made determinate.
However, the doer’s confession is met with icy silence. Rather than return the confession in kind,
the judge rejects commonality with the doer. Hegel states that judging consciousness “repels this
community of nature, and is the hard heart that is for itself, and which rejects any continuity with the
other.”104 Why has the confession not been followed with a reciprocal confession by the judge? Here,
Bernstein points to three important points regarding the doer’s act of confession. First, the assertion of
confession has failed to truly confess anything at all in the eyes of the judge. The confession articulated
the commonality between two individuals acting from conflicting principles. Hence, judging
consciousness perceives a violation of its adopted moral law, i.e., a transgression taking place at the level
of individual human activity, rather than an action at the level of the ethical community. Second, on what
grounds does this act of confession truly warrant a reciprocal response in kind? Acting consciousness
knows that it cannot eliminate the passions that it operates from, in the certainty of its conviction. This,
however erroneous, is nonetheless its conviction. Even though acting consciousness recognizes a
commonality with its judge, it does not follow that it can now claim absolute moral confidence through its
103
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confession or commonality with the other on moral grounds. Lastly, the act of confession does not usher
forth any sense of mutual dependency. Rather, it appears to cloak the necessity of communal dependency
in the interest of demonstrating a sense of equality between the consciousness that stands by the principles
of the community and the individual that has come into opposition to it. However, this is where judging
consciousness differentiates itself from the acting consciousness, who, in an effort to maintain its
individuality, stands in opposition to the community.
Perhaps most significant to the confession is its value as a ‘moral investment’ for acting
consciousness. Acting consciousness takes its confession to be something that demands repayment from
its judge. There is a noted level of expectation that judging consciousness will return the confession,
thereby contributing his part in the community. However, this expectation of moral repayment through a
reciprocated confession gives acting consciousness’s confession what Bernstein refers to as a ‘prudential
character,’ or what may be interpreted as a non-moral ‘ought.’ It is a direct result of expecting repayment
in kind that acting consciousness does not yet see its confession as a throwing away of itself in relation to
the other. Rather, its justification lies in the confessor having recognized the judge to be the same as
himself. The confession merely takes the form of yet another transcendental ‘ought.’ Through its
confession acting consciousness expects repayment in kind—“He ought to confess his identical nature to
me as I confessed to him.” Acting consciousness appears to be still searching for a logical structure by
which to support the justification of its actions. That is, since acting consciousness has done its part, it
believes that judging consciousness ‘ought’ to perform what is expected of it. However, this is precisely
what Hegel was seeking to avoid. To view the confession in this manner would be to invest in an abstract
principle beyond the activities of moral action. This naturally would give rise to moral detachment from
the subjective experience of the confession.
We conclude this part of the dialectic with two conflicting modes of consciousness that have
failed to find continuity with each other. The silent refusal of the ‘hard heart’ to respond in kind to acting
consciousness has allowed for a reflective moment in the dialectic whereby it becomes essential to further
40

explore what is lacking in the act of confession. Specifically, the confession has failed to demonstrate the
necessary component of a kind of humiliation, a throwing away of oneself in relation to an ‘other.’ For
Hegel, this throwing away of oneself is essential for eliminating the misrecognition regarding universality
of the purpose of the action performed in the social setting. The acting consciousness acknowledges its
particularity in the confession. What Hegel means by humiliation is the throwing away of that
particularity, i.e., giving up attachment to one’s self. However, acting consciousness has not recognized
this. This will be further demonstrated in the following section, where I will explicate the breaking of the
‘hard heart’ and the subsequent birth of ‘absolute spirit.’

(3) The Breaking of the Hard Heart
Acting consciousness now sees a reversal of roles in the situation at hand. The silence of the
judging consciousness has been taken by it not just as a repulsion of social continuity but also as a gesture
of wrongdoing. Hegel writes that:

The one who made the confession sees himself repulsed, and sees the other to be in the
wrong when he refuses to let his own inner being come forth into the outer existence of
speech, when the other contrasts the beauty of his own soul with the penitent’s
wickedness, yet confronts the confession of the penitent with his own stiff-necked
unrepentant character, mutely keeping himself to himself and refusing to throw himself
away for someone else.105

In failing to reciprocate the confession with the other, judging consciousness takes the form of the ‘hard
heart’ and withdraws into isolation. Hegel sees this as the ‘extreme form of rebellion’ whereby judging
consciousness shows that it is evil through its withdrawal into itself.
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Both attitudes of consciousness that we have been examining have failed to realize that “in its
confession, [acting consciousness] had ipso facto renounced its separate being-for-self, and thereby
expressly superseded its particularity, and in so doing posited itself in continuity with the other as a
universal.”106 It is only at this moment of delay in the dialectical process (namely, the moment where the
confession of acting consciousness is met with the stony silence of the hard heart) that this crucial point of
renunciation is made apparent. If we follow Bernstein’s interpretation on this subject, the act of
confession involves the risk of humiliation. In virtue of the humiliation that acting consciousness
experiences through the silence of judging consciousness, acting consciousness sees that its confession is
not a ‘moral investment.’ To confess is to throw oneself away in relation to another, i.e., it is the throwing
away of what Hegel calls one’s being-for-self, since what is being revealed to consciousness is the
necessity of absolute dependence on others in order to establish the continuity of one’s identity as a moral
agent with the community. There is a tremendous risk involved in this process of action, which cannot be
underestimated. One must be willing to face social criticism and humiliation when acting on moral
conviction in the modern social realm. The very process of action involves the risk of humiliation before
others. In turn, all actions, moral or otherwise, are acts of personal confession because they expose us to
the judgment of others. In Hegel’s logic, the confession of the penitent is what reveals the dependency of
the actor upon her judge and the community.
However, there is more to be said regarding the silence of judging consciousness. The repulsion
of the confession demonstrates a reversal of order in the dialectic. Now perceived as another incarnation
of the beautiful soul, the mute judge refuses to throw himself away in the same manner that acting
consciousness did. The judge continues to be the moral conviction of the necessity to abide by the abstract
universality of duty that it does not act on. It attempts to maintain moral omnipotence through its stiffnecked silence. Nonetheless, as we have now seen in various incarnations throughout the entirety of this
chapter, action maintains its absolute import for morality in Hegel’s thought. The silent judge is entangled
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in the “contradiction between its pure self and the necessity of that self to externalize itself and change
itself into actual existence.”107 He remains locked-up in his thoughts, denying actuality to both himself
and the penitent. The beautiful soul of the last chapter was reduced to ‘shapeless vapor’ dissolving into
thin air. Similarly, judging consciousness, now taken as another form of the self-destructive withdrawal of
the beautiful soul, becomes “disordered to the point of madness.” It “wastes itself in yearning and pines
away in consumption.”108 The beautiful soul effectively destroys itself through its refusal to respond in
kind to acting consciousness. Bernstein affirms this point by writing that, “madness, in modernity, is
perhaps the only adequate metaphor we have for the self-destruction that is consequent upon the refusal of
the other.”109
The judge’s abstraction from reality has resulted in self-induced chaos. However, it also
represents part of the historical development of the moral self in bringing to light the tremendous
difficulty involved in moral action, communication, and recognition in a modern context. That is to say
that we all want our autonomy, but the established norms and principles of the community necessarily
repress our capacity for individual legislation. The constant activity of acting and judging is, I think,
meant to demonstrate that we can never be in a position that affords us the possibility of completely
identifying with either the principles of the community or the individual convictions of consciousness.
The reconciliation of the hard heart with acting consciousness will be the attempt to establish the birth of
the absolute self, by which Hegel means an ethical self that is derived neither from acting on human law
nor from acting on divine law. Further, reconciliation is necessary for acknowledging that the morality of
an action cannot be gauged merely by focusing on its particularity. For the dialectic to arrive at this
position, the crucial moment of forgiveness is required.
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Hegel writes that “the breaking of the hard heart, and the raising of it to universality, is the same
movement which was expressed in the consciousness that made confession of itself.”110 The hard heart
denotes a side of consciousness breaking away from reality in its withdrawal into itself. In order to
overcome this withdrawal the hard heart must break. This takes place through the renunciation of the
unreality of the hard heart’s position. This can only take the form of forgiveness. Judging consciousness
extends forgiveness to acting consciousness since it now understands that its ‘universal’ standards of duty
cannot be universal if they are independent of the possibility of actions being recognized by others as
such. Bernstein helps to clarify the important role of forgiveness as follows:

Forgiveness is a performative act of recognition. In forgiving you I call you back to my
presence and so return you to yours. Figuratively, forgiveness reverses the vengeful,
metonymic shift of taking your action for you: I turn away from the act towards you, as
you in confessing had turned away from your act and exposed your (whole) self to
me.111

Through the performative act of forgiveness the hard heart renounces the universality that it identified
itself with. For Hegel, the concept of forgiveness belongs to the conditions under which interaction
between modern agents is possible. The hard heart moves from the standpoint of opposition to a point of
subjective continuity with the penitent. The wounds of its madness “heal, and leave no scars behind.”112
The healing takes place in the same manner in which acting consciousness confessed and so threw away
its separate being-for-self. The process of reconciliation demands that the hard heart set aside the abstract
universality of its judgment and therefore its identification with its universality. The forgiveness that the
‘hard heart’ extends to acting consciousness is “the renunciation of itself, of its unreal essential being
which it put on a level with that other which was a real action, and acknowledges that what thought
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characterized as bad, viz. action, is good.”113 To openly forgive is to extend to the doer a self-renunciation
and thereby establish ‘objectively existent Spirit’ as the continuity and identity of the ‘I’=‘I.’
This change of heart is significant, as it represents a shift being made by consciousness to a new
position by way of reconciliation of the appearance of opposition. In surrendering his one-sidedness, the
judge affirms his recognition of himself in the other. Through extending forgiveness, the judge in turn
renounces himself, i.e., he in turn throws himself away by acknowledging that he cannot stand by abstract
universality. The language of confession becomes the “objectively existent spirit, which beholds pure
knowledge of itself qua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pure knowledge of itself qua absolutely
self-contained and exclusive individuality—a reciprocal recognition which is absolute spirit.”114 Further,
just as each confession is a confession of commonality, so too is each instance of forgiveness a
forgiveness of being human, thus reinstating commonality through recognition.
What we have seen is that a new inter-subjective standpoint is ushered forth by way of the
tragedy embedded in the process of recognition. A tremendous amount of literature has been dedicated to
conceptualizing Hegel’s idea of tragedy and the role that it plays in the development of spirit. While I
cannot provide an exhaustive account of the subject given the limited scope of my project, I believe that it
is important to pause and examine its role at this moment in the dialectic. It must be stressed that Hegel
never constructed a formal theory of tragedy. Nonetheless, his ‘use’ of Sophocles’ Antigone demonstrated
certain themes in which a Hegelian idea of tragedy can be understood and found applicable to the
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reconciliation of acting consciousness and judging consciousness. In the remainder of this chapter I will
draw extensively on Bernstein’s reading of the dialectic of evil and its forgiveness.115
Earlier in the Phenomenology, Hegel’s use of Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone was meant to
demonstrate the failures embedded in Greek ethical life.116 These failures culminated in an ethical
impasse whereby the conflict between two figures could not be resolved. Hegel’s interpretation of this
tragedy suggested that individuals of the Greek ethical life simply acted under their respective obligations
towards their social responsibilities. Consequently, since no other course of action was available for the
individuals of Greek ethical life, there is no method by which the conflict can be overcome. We can
consider this a traditionalist interpretation of tragedy.117
In Bernstein’s idea of tragedy the absolute reality of freedom is established in the sublation of
Kant’s absolute self-relation into Hegel’s ethical idea. The absolute reality of freedom provides both the
necessary conditions under which tragedy in a modern ethical state is possible (since only a free subject
can fall victim to tragic fate) and offers the means for resolving a tragic conflict.118 What is of philosophic
import to the current section of the Phenomenology under consideration is that what takes priority in the
tragedy is not a hero falling victim to tragedy, not a conflict of good against evil, but rather the conflict
between right and right, i.e., between individuals staunchly maintaining legitimate positions irrespective
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of any other potentially overriding ethical principle. Stern helpfully clarifies this point by writing that “it
is because each individual identifies him or herself wholly with one overriding ethical imperative that
Hegel characterizes the clash between Antigone and Creon as tragic. Neither is able to step back from the
obligations that go with their naturally determined place in the ethical order.”119 However, we have
arrived at a point in the dialectic where the two forms of consciousness under consideration, Hegel’s postKantian notion of conscience, are at a moment where they can stand back from the obligations of their
place in the ethical order. For Bernstein, Hegel’s dialectic has developed to a moment where a resolution
to tragedy (irrespective of the melancholic results) is possible.
I take Bernstein’s viewpoint on tragedy as a conflict between two positions that are both (a)
equally justified, and yet (b) wrong in the sense that they fail to take into account an oppositional
standpoint. What makes the situation so disconcerting is that tragedy begins when an individual declares a
legitimate position that stands in violation of a contrary yet equally legitimate position, thus exposing the
one-sidedness of the initial claim and/or the one-sidedness of its oppositional standpoint. I have
demonstrated how acting consciousness’s insistence on establishing the certainty of its position
effectively disrupts the ethical balance of the community. This disruption is a threat to both the
community and the acting individual. If the individuals and/or the individual (Hegel’s ambiguity in the
text suggests that this could be interpreted either way) are unable to establish reconciliation, they will in
Hegel’s view either be condemned to humiliation or pine away in rumination on the hurt they feel in
having experienced a trespass on their position in or loyalty to the community. If reconciliation does
occur, it can only occur through tragic action, the transgression of acting consciousness and all that
follows. This implies that the methods of ethical justification from the standpoint of identification with
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the community (i.e. the appeal to abstract universality), since they do not coincide with self-determining
individuality, cannot stand alone as adequate principles of action.120
From a certain perspective, we can take Hegel to be attempting to resolve the problems set by
Kant’s moral system by appealing to an idea of tragedy. Recall that for Hegel, “self-consciousness exists
in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being
acknowledged.”121 At this point in the dialectic, it appears that both acting consciousness and judging
consciousness are unaware of this crucial point made at the beginning of the chapter entitled “Lordship
and Bondage.” Throughout the development of Hegel’s modern moral individual in the Phenomenology,
Kant’s autonomous, self-legislating subject has taken different shapes as Hegel attempts to bring into
action and community and show the consequences of doing so. At our current position in the dialectic, a
transgression had to occur, one that could take place only if a Kantian autonomous subject is in a position
to declare its autonomy from within a community that adheres to abstract universality. It had to occur in
order for both attitudes of consciousness to be confronted with the necessity of a non-traditional social
context for the possibility of individual ethical action. However, this reconciliation only demonstrates that
the boundaries of ethical conduct must remain in an ‘unwritten’ malleable state, since any appeal to
absolute certainty only reveals itself as an absolute untruth that collapses in the continuity of absolute
dependence in the modern ethical community.
The breaking of the hard heart denotes a conversion whereby one adopted standpoint is
transformed into another, with all previously adopted moral standpoints sublated into the current position.
A similar process of conversion took place in the penitent’s confession by way of the judge’s silence, but
only retrospectively. Rather than viewing the confession as something that ‘ought’ to be rewarded with a
response in kind, the confessor was forced to see that his confession must involve a throwing away of
himself in relation to another person. The confession demonstrates the necessity for acknowledgment by
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others in order to have a moment of continuity and commonality in modernity. Further, in renouncing its
omnipotent moral self, judging consciousness renounces its abstract universality, as well as the pain,
anger, and hurt that it may feel in light of acting consciousness’s trespass upon its abstract universality,
thereby situating itself in relation with the other in respect of the duality and relation of universality and
particularity. In forgiveness, in the moment of self-overcoming, the breaking of the hard heart provides us
with a glimpse of ethical community. Hegel summarizes as follows: “The reconciling Yea, in which the
two ‘I’s let go their antithetical existence, is the existence of the ‘I’ which has expanded into a duality, and
therein remains identical with itself, and, in its complete externalization and opposite, possesses the
certainty of itself.”122 The reconciliation of the hard heart with acting consciousness establishes absolute
spirit, its appearance in and through the drama of misrecognition.123 That is, Hegel has attempted to show
that the reconciliation between acting consciousness and judging consciousness is the acknowledgement
that action cannot be gauged merely by focusing on its particularity, nor by insisting on abstractly defined
universal duty. If we are to have any notion of meaningful assessment of moral action in a modern
community, it must be from the perspective of the experience of conscientious subjects who undergo the
diremption of the universal and the particular in their relations to one another and their recognition of this
experience.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

In my conclusion to this thesis we must return to the questions posed at the outset. What
is being revealed about the moral self in modernity? What implications does it have for the
possibility of a Hegelian ethics as distinct from Kantian morality? After a brief summary, I will
address these questions.
This thesis has attempted to identify the appearance of the modern moral individual in
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel first reconstructed the Kantian moral worldview, where
the object of knowledge is pure duty. As I have shown, Hegel found Kant’s moral worldview to
be founded in a self-relation that was incomplete and embedded in an irreconcilable conflict
between morality and nature. What Hegel maintained from Kant is the idea of the absolute selfrelation in morality. Herein lies the necessity of Kant’s contribution to Hegel’s ethical thought.
Kant’s autonomy of the will serves as the starting-point for the possibility of a modern ethical
thought for a community of ethical agents. In chapter two I demonstrated how Hegel released the
Kantian moral subject from its transcendental position, while still maintaining the absoluteness
of the self-relation as the fundamental moment beginning his ethical thought. However, in
making the shift from the transcendental idealist view of the subject to a self as it actually
appears in the world, we found Hegel’s ‘conscience’ falling victim to both (a) the
indeterminateness of its convictions, and (b) the arbitrariness of the action it attempted to
perform from the point of view of morality. Both the fallibalism that rendered action problematic
and the loss of the moral self through pure self-contemplation demonstrated the need for the
moral self to reinstate itself in some other fashion. This was unfolded in chapter three, where I
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examined conscience from the standpoint of action. Chapter three explored how ethical spirit is
made actual through the relationship, conflict, and movement between two forms of
consciousness—a self-determined acting consciousness and a consciousness of judgment.
Reconciliation between these two standpoints was demonstrated through acting consciousness’s
confession of its one-sidedness to judging consciousness and judging consciousness’s failure to
respond in kind to the confession. The rejection of the confession established judging
consciousness as the ‘hard heart’ and determined the necessity of a ‘throwing away’ of oneself in
order for spirit to attain self-certain unity. Acting consciousness throws away the one-sided
affirmation of its particular self. Judging consciousness throws away the one-sidedness of its
abiding by abstract universality. This is the moment where the modern moral individual becomes
identifiable in Hegel. At the same time, we can recognize in Hegel’s dialectical treatment of
moral action, the moment in which the self comes to recognize itself as creating its own history
in relation to others in a social world.
Hegel’s development of spirit as both substance and subject is meant to transcend the
pure subjectivity of the individual.124 Further, as seen in the breaking of the ‘hard heart,’ it is
meant to force consciousness to abandon its claim of self-identification solely through abstract
universality. Herein lies what is being revealed to the self in the modern social order.
Specifically, if we are to have any hope for the possibility of a moral individual, it must be from
the perspective of the context of a modern community comprised of actively participating ethical
agents. Spirit thus moves beyond Kant’s moral theory in an effort to become its own subject
creating its own history, with the actual self taking itself to be universal, not merely particular,
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and at the same time experiencing itself in respect of an objective social world in and through its
relation to others.
What implications does this have for the possibility of a Hegelian ethics as distinct from
Kantian morality? The answer to this question can be addressed in terms of the possibility of a
Kantian morality and Hegel’s ethical idea as they might appear in a community. I will first raise
a common objection against Kantian morality followed by an example of Hegel’s ethical idea.
The idea of appealing to a universal procedure of duty was taken by Hegel to be void of
any and all content as demonstrated in the dialectical treatment of the moral worldview. In fact, it
was the moral worldview that insisted upon this. Hegel found the formalities and abstractions
from reality that the moral world view insisted upon to be completely empty, since the moral
worldview insisted that “duty cannot receive the form of something alien.”125 Yet if we are to
have any notion of an immoral mode of conduct, it is necessary to bring an outside world into
our thought. Relying solely on a categorical imperative procedure that is void of all content will
not yield meaningful results. In fact, it will not yield anything at all. Any notion of duty that is to
be willed must be willed “for the sake of some content.”126 The Kantian, in maintaining that
moral law is prior to both experience and the enactment of social norms/practices has failed to
take into account what gives morality its content, namely a world.
Nonetheless, even if we grant the Kantian the benefit of the doubt and allow for the
possibility of the performance of actions from pure duty in the world, I believe that the
arguments raised against Kantian morality in the Phenomenology still hold. For example, Kant
attempted to demonstrate in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that if we could make
125
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lying a universal action, then language would no longer be a reliable source of communication
since we would no longer have a criterion for truth. For Kant, if I can conceive of a world in
which people lie in order to achieve their goals, then I am effectively conceiving of a world
where the idea of ‘truth’ is valueless. Language in turn is rendered useless since there is no
longer a criterion under which any assertion can be validated. Further, no one would believe
anything that anyone states ‘to be the case’ because everything articulated would be presupposed
as a lie. Since this deception is deliberate the Kantian would have no choice but to view the act
of lying as completely forbidden regardless of any personal convictions that might view this
particular act of deception as ‘good’ or what one ‘ought’ to do under a certain set of
circumstances. This argument should sound familiar given Hegel’s examination of the moral
worldview’s ‘postulates.’ Hegel’s view of the displacements—a shifting of the problem in
respect of action— of the second postulate (the conformity of the sensuous with morality) placed
outside of itself what it initially took to be the basis of its certainty. We arrive at a position where
the moral worldview is not in earnest about its elimination of inclinations (i.e. that an action
‘feels’ like the right thing to do even though it stands in a contradictory relation to one’s pure
duty) since it is positing the harmony of sensuous inclinations and pure duty in an infinite
beyond. However, this is in direct opposition to the initial claims of the autonomous subject and
hence the possibility for the absolutes offered by a Kantian moral system remain in a
transcendent state beyond the possibility of actualization in a world
Does Hegel’s ethical idea offer us a better alternative to Kant’s moral theory? The move
beyond Kant’s moral worldview expresses Hegel’s idea that we can only become conscientious
ethical agents within a community of conscientious agents. This crucial move demonstrates that
the modern moral self must develop beyond its initial understanding of itself as a morally
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autonomous self that knows itself in a community. However, this development comes at a heavy
cost since it establishes our position in a community as one of absolute dependency and
vulnerability. Our actions, as individuations against the community (and hence against oneself
insofar as the agent performing an act in a community is part of the community) are on the one
hand interpreted as transgressions on the community and, on the other, are the method by which
we aspire to establish ourselves in it. Consequently, every conscientious action that we perform
deprives us of what it is that we take ourselves to be as well as our commitment to the ultimacy
of any conception of modern liberalism underlying a community.127 However, the realization of
deprivation is only arrived at retrospectively, i.e. in the silence of our judge. The silence of the
hard heart brings to the center of our attention the idea that in order to gain possession of oneself,
one must risk the humiliation of not being recognized by the community.128 On the other side of
the dialectic, Bernstein’s treatment of the hard heart suggested, as we have seen, that its silence
is indicative of an injured status. If I were to act on a principle that I firmly believe in (and hence
transgress a principle of the community), you will experience injury, suffering, or some degree
of resentment towards me. This resentment is not unwarranted. However, you run the risk of
withdrawal from the community if you turn inwards and ruminate over your grievances. If one
remains in this purely inward state of rumination over injury—what Hegel refers to as the
‘extreme form of rebellion of spirit’—one would effectively render oneself incapable of acting
again. Extending forgiveness becomes inter alia the act of recognition in the form of the release
of the built-up anger we feel over the act of transgression. If there are reservations concerning
Hegel’s ethical idea, it might be in respect of his insistence that the “wounds of Spirit heal, and
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leave no scars behind.”129 It is important to note that what has been forgiven is not the action
itself (since temporally the action belongs to a causal ‘past’), but rather its relation to the
transgressor.130 The wounds of deeply felt injury nonetheless have the capacity to stay with us
throughout our lives. We may aspire to a point where we can be forgiven our trespasses as we
forgive those who trespass upon us, yet Hegel has shown that this hope is not ethical as a mere
expectation. Moreover, the human condition is simply too complex to yield a model of
reconciliation whereby the hurt we experience from trespass can ever be said to truly vanish. Let
us call this melancholia. This melancholia that we experience in respect of the trespasses of
others is constitutive of the tragic unfolding of our ethical history as it continues throughout the
constant reinstituting of the commonality of self-overcoming and the forgiveness that we extend
to each other for being human.
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